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The Social and Political Life of a Relic: The Episode of 
the Moi-e-Muqaddas Theft in Kashmir, 1963–1964
The present article is focused on the 
relationship between a sacred object: the 
moi-e-muqaddas (the Prophet’s hair), housed 
in the Hazratbal shrine in Kashmir, and the 
Kashmiri Muslim community. The relic, which 
was stolen from the shrine on 27 December 
1963, lead to a massive protest in the Kashmir 
valley and in other parts of the subcontinent, as 
people demanded its immediate recovery. Such 
thefts, which have been reported from across 
the world and across centuries, point to the 
extreme value of the relics, and the additional 
value they generate when they are stolen. 
Similarly, the Hazratbal relic theft became a 
vehicle for reifying certain Kashmiri Muslim 
social and political sentiments. The incident 
also catapulted the issue of Kashmir’s political 
accession, which emerged in 1947 at the time 
of the partition of the subcontinent, to the 
forefront, alarming the Indian government. 
The Hazratbal relic episode is also reflective 
of the role of religious ideas and symbols in 
political action in South Asia. 
Keywords: Kashmir, shrine, relic, theft, politics. 
Idrees Kanth
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Introduction 
In an introductory note to a booklet: ‘Moi-e-Muqaddas 
Nabwi Hazratbal Srinagar’ (The Sacred Hair of the Prophet 
in Hazratbal Srinagar), the veteran Kashmiri journalist Sufi 
Mohi-ud-din remarks that it was a spiritually enlightening 
moment for the Kashmiri community when the ‘moi-e-
muqaddas nabwi’ (The sacred hair of the Prophet) made its 
entrance into the Valley of Kashmir. The presence of the 
Prophet’s hair in Kashmir is not only a saadat (blessing) 
for its people, as Sufi emphasises, it has almost elevated 
Kashmir to the status of Medina: ‘Kashmir Medina ba-shud 
az moi-e-nabi’ (Bhat 1999: 1). The moi-e-muqaddas, and the 
Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, where it is preserved, has 
had an immense bearing on the social and political life 
of Kashmir. Over the centuries, the Hazratbal shrine has 
captivated the attention of Kashmir’s rulers, who while 
they have duly acknowledged its spiritual munificence, 
have also realized the political authority that the shrine 
wields. Yet there have been a few occasions, as Sufi writes, 
when Kashmir’s rulers have tried to undermine the pres-
tige of the moi-e-muqaddas, including the Afghan governor 
of Kashmir, Azad Khan, who had to pay for his life after he 
tried to disgrace the relic by removing it from its glass seal. 
There is a popular belief that, whoever has tried to abuse 
the moi-e-muqaddas, has eventually met with a terrible 
fate (Bhat 1999: 2). 
The presence of the moi-e-muqaddas in Hazratbal has 
bestowed it the status of the most important and spiri-
tually elevated shrine in Kashmir. While the shrine has 
attracted hundreds of thousands across the Valley over the 
last two and a half centuries, it has also played a significant 
role in the social and political life of the people of Kashmir 
(Khan 1989: 173). When the relic, intensely venerated by 
the Kashmiri people, went missing from the shrine in 
the last week of December 1963, there was an immense 
outpour of emotion across the Valley of Kashmir, as people 
demanded its recovery, and punishment for those who 
were culpable of stealing it. 
The disappearance of the relic created ruptures at 
multiple levels, fomenting a palpable sense of conscious-
ness and unity in the otherwise internally divided 
Kashmiri Muslim community. It also became an instru-
ment for people to articulate their sentiments related to 
the political future of Kashmir more pronouncedly. This 
essay seeks to make sense of these various sentiments 
that the relic invokes or invoked, especially following its 
disappearance from the shrine. 
The emotion that the theft generated heightened the reli-
gious and regional consciousness of the Kashmiri Muslim 
community, affirming certain boundaries in the process. 
The incident and its aftermath brought to the forefront the 
many relationships that have defined Kashmir’s contem-
porary history and politics: the relationship between 
the Kashmiri Muslim community and the local state, the 
relationship between the Kashmir state and the Indian 
state, and also the relationship between India and Pakistan 
in the context of Kashmir. The relic issue not only unset-
tled New Delhi and particularly Nehru, it also produced 
reverberations in places as far off as Calcutta and even East 
Pakistan, where communal riots broke out. While Pakistan 
protested that the theft was committed on the orders of 
the Indian government, and used the incident to raise 
the Kashmir issue—the status and conflict over political 
sovereignty of the region that emerged from the partition 
of the subcontinent in 1947, which has since engaged India, 
Pakistan, and the Kashmiris on the question of the political 
accession of the state (Bose 2003)—in the Security Council, 
India complained that Pakistan exploited the situation to 
benefit its agenda in Kashmir. 
The present article seeks to investigate the sacred, social 
and political relationships that tie the Kashmiri Muslim 
community with the relic, especially as these relationships 
come to fore and become more palpable following its theft 
in December 1963. While it discusses the relationship 
between the moi-e-muqaddas and the people, the article 
does not concern itself with finding out the perpetrators 
of the relic theft. Nor does it really seek to focus as much 
on the mode and specificity of the protests that followed 
the theft. It examines the relic as an object of reverence 
and celebrity and seeks to understand both why the 
relic has come to be regarded as sacred by its adherents, 
and the political sentiment that it’s theft precipitates 
(Walsham 2010: 10). The study of relics, as Patrick Geary 
rightly observes is not often about the object, but rather 
people (Geary 1990: 3). Material remains become relics as 
a consequence of the beliefs and practices that accumulate 
around them. They are the products and confections of the 
cultures that engender and reverence them. The making 
of them is thus both a social and a cognitive process 
(Walsham 2010: 14). 
Relics: Objects of Veneration, Instruments of Power
A relic is a material object that relates to a particular indi-
vidual or to events and places with which that individual 
was associated. Typically, it is the body or fragment of 
the body of a deceased person. Alongside corporeal relics 
such as skulls, bones, blood, teeth, hair, and fingernails, 
are non-corporeal items that were possessed by or came 
into direct contact with the individual in question. These 
may be articles of clothing: hats, girdles, capes, smocks, 
shoes, and sandals, or pieces of personal property like 
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cups, spectacles, handkerchiefs, weapons, staves, and bells 
(Walsham 2010: 11). In a fundamental sense, a relic is a 
metonymy for the person of a prophet, saint, or other holy 
person (Meri 2010: 103). 
A relic is ontologically different from a representation or 
image. It is not a mere symbol or indicator of divine pres-
ence, but an actual physical embodiment of it, each particle 
encapsulating the essence of the departed person, in its 
entirety (Walsham 2010: 12). However, the relics them-
selves, physical remains of saints, are essentially passive 
and neutral. It is the individuals, the people, who come into 
contact with these objects, giving them value and assimi-
lating them into their history, who are the proper subjects 
of historical inquiry (Geary 1990: 4). Nevertheless, there 
is no way that human and material agency can be disen-
tangled. The agency of the relic is eventually a mediated 
activity between the human and the material object. It is 
the relational and emergent product of material engage-
ment (Malafouris 2008: 34). In other words, the properties 
of the materials are relational and processual. They are 
neither objectively determined nor subjectively imagined 
but are practically experienced (Ingold 2007: 14).
Relics have also functioned as political devices across a 
range of cultures (Walsham 2010: 27). While their vener-
ation creates a ritually bounded community, they have 
often become sources and instruments of political legit-
imation (Schober 1997: 220). Muslim rulers and caliphs 
yoked themselves to the Prophet Muhammad through 
the ownership of his staff and mantle, by employing these 
objects in investiture ceremonies, and by carrying them 
into battle as powerful totems. Similarly the legitimacy of 
British colonial rule of Sri Lanka after 1815 in the eyes of 
its inhabitants was apparently sealed by its custodianship 
of the Buddha’s tooth, possession of which was an ancient 
prerogative and attribute of kingship (Walsham 2010: 27).
Relics thus operate as vectors and embodiments of 
authority and legitimacy, but also as foci for political 
protest. The relic, as Alexandra Walsham writes, has the 
capacity to act as a form of symbolic capital (Walsham 
2010: 25). Initially buried anonymously to hinder vener-
ation, the body of Che Guevara, Castro’s chief lieutenant 
in the Cuban Revolution executed in Bolivia in 1967, was 
later resurrected and revered as that of a martyr to his 
anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideals (Walsham 2010: 
27-28). Relics and other material objects often tend to 
have political afterlives and get invoked and manipulated 
as nationalist symbols by the state and by people across 
classes (Walsham 2010: 28). 
In Kashmir, the hundreds of ziarat and dargah (shrines), 
spread across the Valley are endowed with relics, both 
corporeal and non-corporeal, of saints and holy men 
highly venerated by the people of the region. Of these, the 
Hazratbal dargah is recognised as the most sacred because 
it houses the moi-e-muqaddas. The shrine has also been a 
powerful political platform for the Kashmiri leaders to 
further their political objectives. The influx of devotees to 
the dargah from across the vast geographical area of the 
Valley reveals the significance of Hazratbal as a symbol of 
Kashmiri Muslim unity, both as a religious and a regional 
community (Khan 1989: 181).
The Hazratbal Dargah in the Life of the Community
Unlike the mosque where the formal, communitarian 
gatherings take place, the shrine or the dargah is the 
preferred place for individual or family outings, especially 
for the occasion of urs (festivities associated with the death 
anniversary of a saint) celebration. On this occasion a very 
large group gathers for prayers and for social celebration 
in the form of a mela (religious festival) (Jackson 1989: 
110). The shrines thus encourage social participation, and 
serve as specialised loci within which the particular and 
relatively mundane problems of visitors may be alleviated 
(Kurin 1983: 312). Shrines are therefore, imbued with the 
idea of the sacred, and in turn manifest sacredness.1 
Shrines have been a central component of Kashmiri society 
in general, and Kashmiri Islam in particular. The position 
of the shrine in the religious, social and economic life of 
the Valley is legendary (Zutshi 2014: 121, 127). Kashmiri 
Muslims visit shrines for health, procreation, longevity, 
and relief from floods, famine or diseases, etc. (Khan 1989: 
178). They believe that a visit to the shrines will secure the 
object of their wishes. Sick men will regain health, women 
will be vouchsafed children, and the litigant will win their 
case (Lawrence 1967: 289-290). Of the many shrines in 
Kashmir the Hazratbal dargah is the most revered one, 
because it houses the sacred hair or relic of the Prophet 
Muhammad, the moi-e-muqaddas, also called moi-e-mubarak 
or moi-e-sharief (Bhat 1999: 1-2).2 
The display of relics and their veneration and adoration 
by people has a long tradition in Kashmir’s history. Hiuen 
Tsiang, the Chinese traveller who visited the Valley of 
Kashmir in 631 has written about the tooth of Buddha 
and its veneration by the Buddhist monks of the region 
(Khan 1989: 176; Kaul 2005: 160, 163-164). Similarly, the 
custodians of numerous shrines in Kashmir have preserved 
the relics and belongings of various saints, and they are 
displayed to the devotees on their anniversaries. 
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The preservation of some of these relics and their public 
exhibition on special occasions may speak of the assim-
ilation of the local Hindu-Buddhist practices among the 
Muslims of Kashmir (Khan 1994: 82). A special character-
istic of the devotees during such gatherings is their focus 
on the relic, the object of veneration, with folded hands. 
The devotees may also touch the grave and relics of the 
departed saint to seek benediction (Khan 1994: 82, 228). 
Similarly, the moi-e-muqaddas represents for Kashmiri 
Muslims an object that can be approached with the hope of 
gaining spiritual and material benefits from the supernat-
ural presence and powers that such an object is believed 
to inhabit or manifest (Jacobsen et al. 2015: 1). Such 
objects are defined as sacred and protected from private 
trespass by both prohibiting and prescribing certain types 
of behaviour in relation to them (Wheeler 2006: 10). The 
religious potency of such objects is not only apparent 
from the distinctive forms of behaviour that range from 
gestures and postures of veneration, but also through the 
construction of built environments within which these 
relics function (Trainor 2010: 271). 
The Kashmir historian Ishaq Khan observes that for the 
devotees the shrine of Hazratbal, by virtue of being the 
repository of the Prophet’s relic, is a place of interac-
tion and communication between the Prophet, who is 
visualised as spiritually alive through his relic, and his 
followers. The practice of visiting the Hazratbal dargah 
has therefore been a marked feature in the religious life 
of Kashmiri Muslims (Khan 1989: 175, 177). Apart from 
the usual crowd that throngs the shrine everyday, and 
more so on Fridays, every year on the occasion of two 
festivals: Milad-un-Nabi (birthday of the Prophet) and 
Mairaj-i-Alam (the day commemorating the Prophet’s 
heavenly journey), thousands of people flock to Hazratbal 
from all parts of the Kashmir valley (Khan 1989: 174).3 The 
Valley is supposedly the only region in the Muslim world 
where devotees observe an exceedingly long set of rituals 
beginning from the night proceeding the two important 
events (Khan 2007: 149-181).4 These are occasions among 
others ones in the year, all connected with some events 
in the Prophet’s life, on which the holy relic is exposed to 
the people (Mullik 1971: 119).
From several folk songs and poems composed in Kashmiri 
in praise of the relic, it is evident that there has always 
been an endeavour to attribute the privileges of Medina 
to Hazratbal (Khan 1989: 175). Even today devotees are 
seen touching the hands, body or even the dress of the 
custodian exhibiting the relic in the hope of receiving a 
baraka5 (blessing) besides making vows and offering gifts 
to the sacred shrine in return for granting of their desires. 
This reverence for the sacred hair and its custodians may 
be seen to have fostered what can almost be termed a 
patron-client relationship in a system of pir-muridi6 (the 
relationship between a spiritual master [pir] and his 
disciple [murid]) which has marked the life of the shrine 
in the past (Khan 1989: 179). Though reformists have at 
various points criticized the worship of the divine through 
material objects as idolatry in attempts to restore and 
emphasise the importance of religious teachings and 
doctrines (Jacobsen et al. 2015: 1), it has not stopped devo-
tees from visiting the shrines, and holding them in deepest 
reverence. In Kashmir, while the Ahl-e-Hadith,7 and other 
orthodox sects have sought to diminish the importance 
of Hazratbal and generate doubts about the authenticity 
of the relic, such attempts at deprecating the sacredness 
and venerability of the shrine have seldom met with 
success (Khan 1989: 175). 
The Hazratbal shrine also has an economic significance. 
Following prayers and worship especially during festiv-
ities, nearly everyone indulges in sales purchases and 
amusement, as the area around the shrine turns into 
a mart with shops of grocers, drapers, fruit sellers and 
confectioners (Lal 1913). Hazratbal has also offered 
economic opportunities to merchants and artisans who 
could do good business in the precincts and the neigh-
bourhood of the shrine. To those businessmen who find 
it difficult to sell their goods all through the year, the six 
annual fairs, coupled with the regular Friday congrega-
tions at the shrine, offers a suitable outlet for their surplus 
products (Lal 1913). 
The shrine has also stood as a political platform symbol-
ising the regional consciousness of the Kashmiri people. 
Hazratbal is to the Kashmiri Muslims, as one journalist 
wrote in the context of a siege that the Indian army was 
laid on the shrine in the early nineties, what the Golden 
Temple represents to the Sikhs (Baweja 1993). Reporting 
on the siege, which lasted over fifteen days to remove forty 
odd militants housed inside the shrine premises, the jour-
nalist duly acknowledged, as did many others, that it not 
only hurt the sentiments of the Valley Muslims, but also 
made the Kashmir issue more visible on the international 
platform (Baweja 1993: 18-29). The episode offers one 
among many other examples of the power and authority 
that the shrine wields as a social and political space, and its 
overall significance in the life of the Kashmiri people. 
Realizing the importance of the Hazratbal shrine, Sheikh 
Abdullah, the most prominent Kashmiri political leader, 
brought it under the control of the Auqaf8 in 1943. Soon the 
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shrine became an important site for promoting the politics 
of National Conference that Abdullah espoused and which 
stood in stark opposition to that of the Muslim Conference, 
the organization that controlled the other important 
religious power center: the Jamia Masjid, in downtown 
Srinagar.9 After Abdullah’s expulsion from the office of 
Prime Minister10 of Kashmir in 1953 on the orders of the 
central Indian government, the shrine became a platform 
for the Kashmiri Muslim leadership to further its political 
objectives and to seek the release of Abdullah (Khan 1989: 
181). Later in the 1960s and onwards into 1970s, Abdullah 
focused his attention on the reconstruction of the shrine. 
He demolished the old historical Hazratbal mosque built in 
the seventeenth century, considered one of the best spec-
imens of the wooden architecture of Kashmir, to rebuilt 
it on an Islamic pattern, to immortalise his political links 
with the dargah, and to gain further popularity among the 
local people. He toured various parts of the Valley and 
visited almost every house, particularly in Srinagar city, to 
raise funds for its reconstruction (Khan 1989: 186-187). 
Given the immense significance that the Hazratbal shrine 
holds in the life of the Kashmiri Muslim community, the 
wave of resentment and anger that the theft of the relic 
generated is therefore, quite self-explanatory. 
The Moi-e-Muqaddas
Unlike other prophets and holy persons, Prophet 
Muhammad became the object of veneration precisely 
because his teachings, sayings and silent affirmations 
were meticulously preserved by his companions and his 
family and transmitted to subsequent generations, who 
also preserved and employed his relics: hair, and sweat 
and water from prayer ablution as relics, seeking to derive 
baraka from them even after his death (Meri 2010: 102-104). 
Islamic commentaries and reports indicate that the 
Prophet distributed his hair after shaving for ihlal (the 
desacralisation ritual) after his final and only pilgrimage 
to Mecca.11 Al-Bukhari and Muslim cite a report in which it 
is said that the Prophet cut his hair upon completing the 
pilgrimage, and instructed Abu Talhah to distribute one 
share of the hair to each of the sahabah (male companions 
of the Prophet), and to Abu Talhah’s wife Umm Sulaym to 
distribute two shares to the women (Wheeler 2006: 72). 
According to another account, it was this distribution 
that established the tradition of baraka being associated 
with the hair of the Prophet. Other reports and accounts 
mention that the Prophet Muhammad made this distri-
bution at the completion of his pilgrimage so that his 
followers could keep the objects as relics, and that there 
was no hair that fell from his head that was not collected 
by his followers (Wheeler 2006: 72, 2010: 341-388). There 
are also multiple traditions and accounts associated with 
the further transportation of the Prophet’s hair and other 
relics. The transportation of hair by the companions of 
the Prophet and farther distribution of this hair through 
conquest is evident from the records of burial, especially 
at sites of martyrdom or conquest, as Brannon Wheeler 
mentions in his book. 
In the context of Kashmir, it is reported that a rich local 
merchant, Khwaja Nuruddin Ishbari purchased the holy 
relic for one hundred thousand rupees from Sayyid 
Abdullah of Bijapur, who had brought it to the Deccan from 
Medina (Khan 1989: 174). Ishbari died on his way home 
from Bijapur in 1699, and the relic was brought to Srinagar 
along with his dead body. As a mark of respect in response 
to popular sentiment, Fazil Khan, the Mughal governor of 
Kashmir ordered that the relic be housed at a mosque in 
Bagh-i-Sadiqabad, an area situated on the western bank 
of the Dal Lake. The place has since come to be known as 
Hazratbal, the abode of the Prophet Muhammad, while 
the shrine is referred to as Asar-i-sharif (relic shrine) (Khan 
1989: 174). Gradually a village grew around the shrine 
(Mullik 1971: 117). 
Since the sacred hair was kept at Hazratbal, the place 
became the center of pilgrimage for Kashmiri Muslims. As 
mentioned, Hazratbal signifies the Medina thani (second 
Medina) for its devotees in the Valley. This as Ishaq Khan 
informs us arose not only from the devotees’ unbounded 
veneration of the Prophet but also from practical diffi-
culties in performing the sacred duty of the hajj (Khan 
1989: 177). Hajj was beyond their reach owing to the abject 
poverty in which they lived. Thus a visit to the shrine 
would, at least, have reduced in the devotees’ religious 
consciousness the physical barriers between the Arab and 
the Ajam (non-Arab world). This sentiment is reflected in 
the following verses:
Whosoever has seen the sacred hair of Muhammad,
He has seen the vision of the Prophet,
[Although] he is entombed in Arabia,
His sacred hair sanctifies the Ajam
He reveals the eternal reality of his radiance only to 
those in Kashmir 
Who have an abiding faith and are spiritually illu-
minated (Khan 1989: 177). 
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The local tradition goes that the moi-e-muqaddas had been 
stolen or surreptitiously removed on two occasions in the 
past, but on both these occasions it came back to Hazratbal 
by a miracle. The locals believe that the moi-e-muqaddas 
had by its own grace travelled from Arabia to the Hazratbal 
lake in Kashmir and would not allow itself to be removed 
for any considerable period from its place of rest and 
would always come back (Mullik 1971: 118-119).
Even when it was removed to the mosque, the relic 
remained under the control of Nuruddin Ishbari’s descen-
dants, and they were the only people who were entitled 
to exhibit the moi-e-muqaddas to the public (Mullik 1971: 
117, 119). Every year on special occasions the relic with the 
large silver trapping is offered for deedar from the balcony 
of the Hazratbal mosque, to show it to thousands of 
pilgrims congregated in the huge yard in front. Despite the 
stray apprehensions that the relic was not well protected, 
the belief was that it protects itself. However, in the 
winter of 1963, towards the end of the December month, 
the Kashmiri people were in for a rude shock. The relic 
was stolen. 
The Theft of the Relic
Oh zalimo, waapas karo
[Oh tyrants, return it back] (Gauhar 1998: 93).
On the intervening night of 26 and 27 December 1963, the 
moi-e-muqaddas was stolen from its repository at the shrine 
of Hazratbal in Srinagar. The wooden box containing the 
relic had been taken out from the small shelf in which it 
had been kept, after forcing the shelf open. The last time 
when a deedar had been given was on 20 December 1963. 
After the deedar, Abdul Rahim Banday, the mutawalli (a 
senior custodian of the shrine), had put the relic back in its 
place (Mullik 1971: 119). 
The news about the loss of the relic travelled like wild 
fire throughout the snowbound Kashmir valley. And 
even though weather conditions were not pleasant12 
large crowds started collecting at the shrine from 
early morning (Malhotra 2010). By the afternoon of 27 
December, thousands of people were marching through 
the streets of Srinagar, protesting against the theft and 
demanding its immediate restoration. The town observed 
a spontaneous and complete hartal (strike). The senti-
ments of the people of the Valley “had been deeply hurt 
due to the sacrilege committed in respect of something, 
which they held to be highly sacred and dearer than even 
their lives” (Mullik 1971: 120). 
The hartal continued over the next day on 28 December, 
paralysing the Srinagar city completely. All stores and 
offices were closed and taxis and horse-drawn carriages 
were taken off the roads.13 Processions from different 
parts of the city and adjoining areas started marching 
towards the city center, Lal Chowk, gathering into a great 
jaloos (procession), raising slogans and waving black flags. 
Women were also involved in the protests, occupying the 
other end of Lal Chowk. At the Residency road, near Lal 
Chowk, the jaloos was intercepted by Bakshi Abdul Rashid, 
the General Secretary of the ruling National Conference 
government, and the cousin of the former Prime Minister 
of the state, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, who arrived on 
the scene in his blue Chevrolet. Rashid told the crowd to 
disperse and not to create any trouble. His interception 
however, proved counter-productive and incited the 
crowd who started throwing kangris (portable fire pots 
used to keep warm in the Kashmiri winter) at him. His car 
was also overturned, and later burnt. While he escaped the 
scene, the incident galvanised the entire public opinion 
against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his family and 
blamed them for the theft. This triggered further rage 
in the crowd and they burnt down, two movie theatres, 
Amreesh and Regal, that were owned by Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammad’s brother, Bakshi Abdul Majeed (Bhat 1980: 
104; Swami 2007: 42).14 
On Residency Road, they even attempted to attack the 
All India Radio Station in Srinagar. However, the police 
intervened and saved the building from being damaged 
(Mullik 1971: 122). The attack on the station may have been 
spontaneous, but it could be suggestive of an emerging 
consciousness among the protestors that the local state 
at the behest of the powers in India may have carried out 
the theft. In the opinion of an officer, the excited crowd 
carried out the attack because, according to them, the 
station did not give a correct account of the previous 
evening’s happenings (Mullik 1971: 122). 
Others claimed that the Radio Station was generally an 
instrument of false propaganda, and thus an object of ire 
(Bhat 1980: 104). Meanwhile wave upon wave of people 
continued to pour in from across the Valley, converging at 
Hazratbal. En route to Hazratbal volunteers had organised 
free snacks, hot tea, lunches and dinners. The Pandits and 
Sikhs were also out on the roads to provide moral support 
to the Muslim protestors (Gauhar 1998: 94).15 
While the crowd dispersed in the evening, the intensity 
of the public’s anger unsettled the corridors of power 
in Delhi. Hours later in a special radio broadcast on All 
India Radio: ‘Address to the Nation’, usually delivered 
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on the Independence Day of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, the 
Indian Prime Minister appealed to the Kashmiri people 
“to exercise restraint at this hour of national tragedy” 
(Gauhar 1998: 95). He also assured them that the relic 
incident would be thoroughly investigated. However, 
Nehru’s speech made little impact on the protestors, even 
as he reiterated his commitment to investigate the matter 
in yet another radio broadcast on the next evening of 29 
December. In fact, the situation became only more volatile, 
forcing the central government to send over an Indian 
Civil Services officer, V. Viswanathan, the Home Secretary, 
to Kashmir, to tackle the situation. A few officers of the 
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), including its director 
B. N. Mullik, also reached Srinagar on 30 December to help 
with the investigation process. Earlier, arrangements had 
been made for moving a Punjab Armed Police and a Central 
Reserve Police battalion to Kashmir (Bhat 1980: 104-105). 
People seemed unfazed by all these developments and the 
hartal continued unabated over the next few days. Multiple 
gatherings of protestors would as usual assemble around 
in the city demanding the recovery of the moi-e-muqaddas. 
On one occasion, the Armed Police reinforcements fired 
at protestors at three places around the Lal Chowk area, 
killing a few people and injuring a dozen more. Mullik 
noted that “the entire Kashmir valley was breaking up 
and something had to be done within a week, otherwise 
there was every danger of a conflagration with Pakistan 
over this.” He was particularly concerned that the Pakistan 
Radio was gloating over the incidents in Kashmir and loudly 
accusing the Indian government for having engineered 
the theft to suppress the Muslims of the valley, and that 
“there were people in Kashmir who were moved by this 
form of propaganda” (Mullik 1971: 123). Here is how Mullik 
describes a typical day during the course of the agitation: 
Everything was closed: offices, schools, shops, cin-
emas, restaurants. Langars (eating places) had been 
set up at various places in the town. Large crowds 
were coming from villages carrying food, bedding 
and even fuel for warming their bodies. All the 
main roads were blocked by thousands of people. 
The smallest procession was at least a mile long 
covering the entire width of the road including the 
footpaths. The temperature was ranging at night 
to several degrees below the freezing point. The 
sun never came out and it was raining and snowing 
all the time. All play grounds and other places of 
meetings were frozen with several inches of solid 
ice on the surface, yet three public meetings had 
collected between fifty to seventy thousand people. 
The Ministers were virtual prisoners confined to 
their houses with police guards protecting them. 
All public institutions and offices were guarded by 
armed police. A vehicle, to be able to come out on 
the public roads, had to carry a black flag. Most of 
the [government] staff were also amongst the [pro-
testing] crowd. Small periods were regulated when 
groceries and vegetable shops could be opened for 
the convenience of the people. Every wall of the 
city was full of posters, and every house had a black 
flag (Mullik 1971: 129).
During this time, the printing presses across Kashmir 
remained closed due to the hartal and no newspapers could 
be published (Mullik 1971: 130, 134). With the government 
and the administration of Khwaja Shamas-ud-din, the local 
Prime Minister, appearing almost paralysed and unable 
to make any interventions to overcome the situation, 
the local officers of the state had started reporting to 
Mr. Viswanathan instead (Bhat 1980: 106). Amidst the 
breakdown of state machinery, a rumor surfaced on 30 
December that the relic had been recovered, and that a 
couple of people from Kangan, in the outskirts of Srinagar, 
had been arrested for the theft. Sanaullah Bhat, the editor 
of the most popular Urdu newspaper of the Valley, Aftab, 
promptly sought a meeting to confirm the rumour with 
the Deputy Inspector General of Jammu & Kashmir Police, 
Ghulam Qadir Ganderbali, who had set up a special cell 
inside the Shergarhi Police Station, in Srinagar to probe 
into the theft. 
Ganderbali looked somewhat anxious, and on being asked 
about the validity of the claim that the relic had been 
recovered, responded by posing a counter question to 
Bhat: “if the relic is recovered would people doubt its 
authenticity?” Bhat soon realized that the news of the 
recovered relic was a hoax floated by the government to 
anticipate public response (Bhat 1980: 107). The next day, 
another rumor that the relic had been recovered from a 
boat near the Hazratbal shrine gained ground. Supposedly, 
a person had wrapped the relic in a shawl and left it there. 
Though Bhat was convinced that it was only a rumour, 
he nevertheless sought to confirm the news. On being 
told by Ganderbali that it had indeed been recovered and 
that Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had gone to Delhi to 
get the silver bottom of the relic cover repaired, he was 
absolutely stunned. When asked by Bhat why the news of 
the recovery was not shared with the public, Ganderbali’s 
cautious response was that unless they were convinced 
that nobody would challenge its genuineness, they could 
not risk a public disclosure (Bhat 1980: 107). Obviously, the 
government was not only aware of the implications of not 
being able to recover the relic, but also the authenticity of 
the recovered relic.
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An Action Committee had also been formed to assist 
with the recovery of the relic, the Jamiat Hasoole Moi-e-
Muqaddas (Bhat 1980: 108).16 The Committee was a union 
of otherwise oppositional figures: Farooq Abdullah and 
Maulana Masoodi, the supporters of Sheikh Abdullah, 
Mirwaiz Farooq, the eminent religious cleric and Ghulam 
Mohiuddin Karra who were pro-Pakistan, the Shia leader 
Abbas Ansari, and even Peer Saad-ud-din Tarbali, the state 
President of the Jamat-i-Islami, all of whom apparently 
advocated a popular referendum as a means to resolve the 
impending political issue of Kashmir. This rare demonstra-
tion of unity following the theft of the relic only reveals 
the significance of the relic and its authority to bring 
together different leaders and sections of the community, 
under a single platform (Lockwood 1967: 387). 
Meanwhile, as the campaign for the recovery of the 
moi-e-muqaddas became stronger, the demand for Sheikh 
Abdullah’s release from captivity became equally vocif-
erous.17 Posters were also issued demanding the resolution 
of the Kashmir issue by the United Nations, while seeking 
the intervention of Muslim countries including Pakistan 
in the matter. Mullik felt that the propaganda was entirely 
fuelled by the Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir Radios, who 
blamed India for the disappearance of the moi-e-muqaddas 
with the purpose of breaking the morale of the Kashmiri 
Muslims. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, “that large 
numbers of people in the Valley started believing this 
slander” (Mullik 1971: 132-133). A copy of a letter alleged 
to have been sent by Abdullah to Nehru was circulated in 
the form of a poster. The poster stressed that the “Prime 
Minister [Nehru] should accede to people’s demands and 
do the right thing before the situation went completely out 
of control” (Mullik 1971: 134, 139). In fact the protesting 
public had by now coined a new slogan: 
Yeh mulk hamara hai
Iska faisla hum karenge
[This is our mulk; we shall decide its future]  
(Gauhar 1998: 96)
The Indian government was not only concerned about 
the implications that the relic theft had brought about 
in Kashmir, but also the more serious repercussions it 
could have in the Muslim world. The government felt that 
“Pakistan would use this as a lever both to move the Security 
Council” and also meddle with the affairs of Kashmir in the 
Valley. Thus, only the recovery of moi-e-muqaddas could save 
the situation for them (Mullik 1971: 135).18 
The Relic Returns
On 4 January around 6:15 pm an announcement from 
Radio Kashmir, Srinagar confirmed that the relic had been 
recovered. The announcement was very short and concise: 
“Today in the afternoon of 4 January, the moe-i-mubarak 
was found inside the Hazratbal mosque. Its authenticity 
has been attested by the concerned individuals. Further 
investigation is on in the matter.” The All India Radio 
also made repeated announcements confirming that the 
relic had been recovered. However, agitation and protests 
continued as usual (Bhat 1980: 108-109). 
On 5 January, which was a Sunday, Mr. Viswanathan called 
a press conference at the Guest House in Srinagar. He 
told the journalists that the relic would soon be restored 
inside the Hazratbal shrine. He also announced that the 
CBI would conduct further investigation into the matter, 
and the case would be taken up by a court. However, none 
of the local newspaper correspondents were invited for 
the press conference. And those who were invited were 
all non-Muslims who reported for newspapers outside the 
state (Bhat 1980: 109). 
Meanwhile, the Jamiat Hasoole Moi-e-Muqaddas held a 
meeting at Lal Chowk, Srinagar and made following 
demands on the government:
i. That the relic should not remain in the custody of 
the state authorities but promptly restored inside 
the Hazratbal shrine premises.
ii. That the relic should be identified and authenti-
cated by a joint committee consisting of represen-
tatives appointed by people, and officials from the 
government side. 
iii. That the relic incident should be thoroughly 
investigated by the CBI.
iv. That the hearing of the case should be conduct-
ed under the auspices of a high court judge from 
outside of the State. 
v. That all those people arrested during the agita-
tion should be released (Bhat 1980: 109-110).19 
The Committee also made an appeal to the public to stop 
the ongoing hartal and not participate in any programs 
or protests without its permission. Despite the appeal the 
situation remained full of discontent, though the intensity 
of crisis decreased a bit (Bhat 1980: 110; Lamb 1991: 205). 
Meanwhile on 6 January, the government issued a circular 
asking all the employees of the state to attend their offices 
punctually. The circular stated that “any government 
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servant or employee of a government undertaking found 
absenting himself from work will be immediately placed 
under suspension with a view to his dismissal from 
service.”20 The reasoning behind the circular was that since 
the sacred relic had been recovered there was no longer 
any cause for mourning. The circular also declared “that 
full police protection would be provided for the shops 
doing business, and anybody molesting persons engaged 
in their normal avocations or obstructing or intimidating 
persons will be severely dealt with.”21 However, on the 
same day more than two hundred thousand people arrived 
in processions from across the city and far off villages 
and assembled in Lal chowk to hear Maulana Masoodi, 
who was due to address this gathering. When a volunteer 
unfurled an umbrella to shield him from the falling snow, 
he snatched it and threw it aside. Immediately, in a gesture 
of unity, thousands of umbrellas were similarly rolled shut, 
as Masoodi continued to speak to a rapt audience for more 
than an hour, as they raised occasional slogans saying: we 
want immediate recovery of moe-i-sharief, we want plebi-
scite (Gauhar 1998: 97).
On 8 January, Mr. Viswanathan convened a second press 
conference. Unlike previously, the local press reporters 
were also invited to attend. However, when Sanaullah Bhat 
drew his attention towards the popular demand for the 
identification of the holy relic, Viswanathan responded 
dismissively saying that whoever was demanding this 
was speaking the language of Pakistan (Bhat 1980: 110). 
Viswanathan was also unmoved to respond to any ques-
tion related to the relic theft and the subsequent process 
that led to its recovery (Bhat 1980: 110). His diplomatic 
rejoinder, in conformity with a press-note issued by the 
Home Ministry, Government of India stated that whoever 
had stolen the relic fearing that he may be caught, had 
returned it back (Bhat 1980: 110). Eventually on 10 January 
the relic was reinstalled inside the Hazratbal shrine at 9:00 
pm on the orders of the District Magistrate. Mullik says the 
restoration was done in the late evening to avoid undue 
excitement or crowding on the way (Mullik 1971: 148). The 
traditional custodians of the shrine carried the relic to 
its place of installation. As soon as the relic arrived at the 
shrine hundreds of people from around the Hazratbal area 
flocked to the place despite a bitter and terrible weather. 
A government statement claimed that “women burst into 
prayerful singing which lasted for some hours and all 
those inside and outside the shrine joined in the prayers. 
The sacred shrine was immediately illuminated.”22 Orders 
were also issued by the District Magistrate that the relic 
be kept in an iron safe, whose keys were to remain with 
the local Inspector General of Police for the time being.23 
On this occasion, Prime Minister Shams-ud-din issued a 
press statement seeking appreciation for his government 
for standing up to its obligation of recovering the relic and 
redeeming its promise to the Kashmiri people. His admin-
istration, the Prime Minister claimed, had fully shared 
the grief and pain of the people at the loss of the sacred 
relic. Shams-ud-din also announced that all “government 
offices throughout the state will remain closed tomorrow” 
and that “there will be illuminations on all government 
buildings, offices and shops.” He also offered to spend one 
hundred thousand rupees on making Hazratbal shrine safe 
and secure, and to preserve what he described as the great 
“national relic for all times.”24 
Just before departing for Delhi, on 14 January, the Home 
Secretary called another press conference to reply to 
questions on the authenticity and the identification of 
the moi-e-muqaddas. He said the relic was genuine and he 
did not want to enter into any discussion on the ques-
tion.25 When asked whether a public viewing of the relic 
would be allowed, Viswanathan’s response was that it 
might be due for deedar on 6 February. However, popular 
resentment did not subside completely. Many people still 
carried black flags in their hands, and others still had 
them tied to their vehicles.26 
The Public Deedar
Asli mujrim ko pesh karo
[Produce the real culprit]
While a large section of people believed that it was Bakshi 
Ghulam Mohammad who had engineered the theft, 
there was no conclusive evidence to support the theory. 
There were others who thought Bakshi was by birth and 
family tradition a committed devotee of Hazratbal, and 
therefore, would not desecrate the moi-e-muqaddas. The 
First Information Report (FIR) lodged by the government 
included the pro-Pakistan leader Mohi-ud-din Karra, 
Sheikh Rashid, a nephew of Sheikh Abdullah, and one M.S. 
Qureshi as the offenders. Apparently, their objective was 
to destabilize Bakshi and eliminate his hold on Kashmir 
politics. Yet another section of people believed that Nehru 
had green signalled such steps to cause the political death 
of Bakshi, who by 1963 had lost his political utility for the 
Indian state (Gauhar 1998: 100-101). There was also an 
opinion that Sheikh Abdullah wanted to encourage the 
relic agitation for personal gain and may perhaps well 
have engineered the theft through some of his contacts in 
the Valley, while he was himself suffering in the jail. G.N. 
Gauhar, a local high court judge, who was witness to the 
entire incident, mentions that Sheikh was a dejected pris-
oner. While he felt wronged and humiliated by Nehru and 
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India and was bitter about it, he also felt that Pakistan had 
not come to his rescue and of Kashmir sufficiently enough. 
Gauhar writes that Abdullah felt dismayed by the fact that 
people in Kashmir had not reacted enough when he was 
accused and subsequently arrested the second time around 
in 1958, in the Kashmir Conspiracy Case [refer to endnote 
17]. Thus, the relic theft, which the FIR claimed was plotted 
by Sheikh Rashid among others, was supposed to facilitate 
Abdullah’s release to rejuvenate his political life, and to 
destabilise Bakshi, supposedly the main hurdle in their 
way (Gauhar 1998: 101-103). These conspiracy theories 
reveal the significance and the power of a religious symbol 
to intervene upon the political life of a community, and the 
different ways it could be used to make political gains. 
However, before the relic had been ‘recovered’ or even 
installed inside the shrine, 1200 miles away in Khulna in 
East Pakistan, the news of the loss instigated communal 
riots, as rumor gained ground amongst Muslims of the 
subcontinent that the desecration was a deliberate Hindu 
act. President Ayub Khan’s statement that Muslims of 
Kashmir were not responsible for the missing of the relic, 
and the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s exhortation that 
the Hindus must have stolen the relic and were jeopar-
dizing the practice of Islam in India incited the workers 
in the industrial suburb of Khulna, who gathered into a 
procession of 20, 000, setting fire to buildings and looting 
the shops run by the minorities (Ghosh 1998: 106-107; Das 
2000: 287). While the Pakistan government stated that 
twenty nine- people were killed, the Indian government 
statements estimated the number of deaths at nearly 200.27 
Following these incidents, a million Hindu refugees left 
East Bengal to migrate into India (Chatterji 2007: 111). The 
relic incident also provoked riots in Calcutta in the second 
week of January 1964, and in Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh, 
as the communal undercurrent spread around (Das 2000: 
287). Thus the relic affair, while it emerged in a local 
setting, also impinged on the broader Hindu-Muslim rela-
tions in the subcontinent and with some serious impact. 
Meanwhile, Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the 
United Nations Security Council, pressing for its imme-
diate resolution, enough to ring a few alarms in the Indian 
camp. The Indian government, and its officers in the 
state: Viswanathan and Mullik in turn blamed Pakistan 
for inciting the Kashmiri Muslims and for convincing 
them that the restored moi-e-muqaddas was not the real 
one (Mullik 1971: 150; Bhat 1980: 112). While the hartal 
and agitation had diluted by this point, the demand for 
authentication of the relic did not end. In fact as a mark 
of protest the shopkeepers in Srinagar, would close their 
shops at 4:00 pm, before their stipulated time of closure 
(Bhat 1980: 112). With the situation not improving and the 
demand for authentication of the relic growing louder, 
Mullik and Viswanathan returned back to the Valley on 
25 January (Mullik 1971: 151). On 30 January Lal Bahadur 
Shastri, a Cabinet Minister in Jawaharlal Nehru’s govern-
ment, was sent to Kashmir to assess the situation in the 
state. Having reached Kashmir, Shastri met with Maulana 
Masoodi, Mirwaiz Farooq, Farooq Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammad, Shams-ud-Din, and others in his effort to 
resolve the situation. Two days after his arrival, the 
government decided to allow a public deedar of the holy 
relic on 6 February. 
Sanaullah Bhat had different apprehensions though. He 
felt that unless the relic was properly authenticated and 
people were convinced that it was genuine, the deedar 
might not be such a worthwhile exercise. In fact, there was 
every indication that it would complicate matters enor-
mously. Bhat thought that if the genuineness of the relic 
could not be established at this moment, then doubts about 
its authenticity would linger on for generations. However, 
the authorities were not convinced. In their opinion 
seeking the authentication of the relic was a risk in itself, 
and they were not prepared to undertake it (Bhat 1980: 
113). In fact both Viswanathan and Mullik were strongly 
against holding the identification. They were worried if 
the Action Committee gave a negative verdict of the relic, 
it might lead to riots in the Valley, which in turn might 
lead to riots in different parts of India as well. And if the 
identification of the relic was important, Mullik’s opinion 
was that it must be confined to men of religion and no 
members of the Action Committee should be included in 
the team of identifiers. Eventually it was decided that the 
selection of the holy men who were to authenticate the 
relic, be left to the Action Committee, while the Kashmir 
government was to have no say in the matter (Mullik 
1971:158-161).28 The authentication, a special deedar, was to 
take place on 3 February. 
On 3 February, the members of the Action Committee 
arrived at Hazratbal along with the would-be identifiers 
of the relic. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister Shams-
ud-Din, the Inspector General of Police, and many other 
high-ranking officers were already present there (Bhat 
1980: 114). Though the main crowd had been kept away 
from the mosque, a large number of people had filtered 
through, and the yard in front of the shrine was full. The 
formal proceedings commenced at 1:30 pm, and were 
carried out by Masoodi. The atmosphere, as Mullik writes, 
was tense and electric, as Masoodi began delivering “a 
religious-cum-political lecture to the holy men” (Mullik 
1971: 161). Then he gave each of the fourteen identifiers a 
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copy of the Holy Koran and asked them to swear by it that 
they would only give the correct verdict. The fourteen 
took the oath. After this, Noor Din Banday, the mutawalli 
of the shrine appeared before the gathering holding a big 
box in his hands. The first to give verdict was faqir Meerak 
Shah Kashani, the most revered pir (saint) of Kashmir. 
While Mullik claims that Kashani uttered the single word, 
haq (right) (Mullik 1971: 162), Bhat is of the opinion that 
the faqir and others only cautiously remarked that “God 
wishing it may with all certainty be the same” (Bhat 1980: 
114). Bhat further believes that the relic was not shown 
to anyone, and nobody verified its genuineness at that 
moment (Bhat 1980:114). How much of this is true is not 
easily ascertainable. But the intensity of the situation 
could be realised from the fact even after the matter had 
been settled, Nehru thoughtfully inquired of the diplomat 
and his Foreign Secretary, Y.D. Gundevia, “what would 
have happened if Masoodi had declared, at that moment, 
that the bal (hair) wasn’t genuine”? (Swami 2007: 42). But 
it did not come to that. Instead it was announced that the 
relic had been verified and that there would be a public 
deedar on 6 February. The crowd that gathered outside 
appeared to have maintained composure and silence, 
but their hearts as Bhat writes, were filled with be-dili 
(dismay), tazazub (apprehension), and shak-o-shubah 
(doubt) (Bhat 1980:114). 
On 6 February on the occasion of the urs char-yaar (cele-
bration to honour the first four caliphs of Islam), the 
reinstalled moi-e-muqaddas was displayed to the public 
from the Hazratbal shrine. A crowd of about 60, 000 people 
had collected to witness the deedar (Mullik 1971: 164). 
On the same day Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto, and the Indian representative, M.C. Chagala, 
were locked in an argument about Kashmir at the United 
Nations. Nevertheless, the enigma around the relic 
controversy did not to die, and the demand to know the 
real culprit of the theft continued for months: asli mujrim 
ko pesh karo (Malhotra 2010). 
On 12 February, the Indian Home Minister, Gulzari Lal 
Nanda informed the Parliament that the investigation in 
the relic theft would be completed in a week and soon the 
case would be referred to a court. While he claimed that 
the culprits had been booked, he was not ready to divulge 
their names. However, on 17 February, Nanda told the 
Parliament that three people: Abdul Rahim Banday, the 
head mutawalli of the Hazratbal shrine, Abdur Rashid, an 
agricultural officer from South Kashmir town of Tral and 
Qadir Bhat, a relatively unknown man had been arrested 
in the relic theft (Bhat 1980: 115). But nothing emerged 
out of these arrests. A couple of months later, Rashid 
was released and reinstated to his former job. Rahim 
Banday was also released on bail a few months later, but 
was banned from exhibiting the holy relic, until Sheikh 
Abdullah removed the ban in the late 1970s. As for Qadir 
Bhat, his whereabouts remained completely unknown. 
Thereafter, no other investigation, and no court cases were 
conducted, and no further action was taken in this regard. 
Apparently even the leaders of the Action Committee did 
not insist on the trial (Bhat 1980: 116). 
However, in the meanwhile, a couple of changes were 
called for. Nehru, realised that the Shams-ud-din govern-
ment could not function any more, and with Bakshi having 
lost his usefulness to India, and having been discredited 
recently, it was decided to hand over the reins of Kashmir 
to Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq. Sadiq was seen in many 
quarters as a man of integrity, and his elevation was 
expected to usher a new phase in Kashmir’s politics (Bazaz 
1964). Nehru, who was shaken by the relic experience, was 
apprehensive, as Mullik writes, that unless some things 
were done, another catastrophe might befall the Valley 
and the anger of people of Kashmir would ultimately turn 
against India (Mullik 1971: 167). Sadiq’s appointment was 
thus an attempt towards restructuring India’s Kashmir 
policy (Swami 2007: 42), which had come loose over the 
last few months, but more so through the Bakshi years, 
whose administration having served its purpose, was now 
claimed to have been corrupt. Through the change of the 
guard thus, Bakshi’s influence on the region’s politics was 
sought to be curtailed, and a supposedly new approach 
was to be adopted on Kashmir (Swami 2007: 42; Mullik 
1971: 172).
There were also rumours that Sheikh Abdullah and his 
associates who were under detention in the Kashmir 
Conspiracy Case of 1958 would be released soon, which 
they eventually were on the morning of 8 April 1964. 
Perhaps this was another attempt on the part of Nehru 
and his administration towards changing their approach 
to Kashmir affairs, and to also assuage the feelings of its 
people. Mullik says that Nehru realised that Abdullah had 
a strong hold on the Kashmiri people and in the changed 
circumstances no political settlement in the Valley was 
possible without him (Mullik 1971: 172).29 The local anger 
against Nehru along with the affirmation that his paral-
ysis and eventually his death immediately after the relic 
incident was a direct result of him having desecrated the 
mosque: kedes darghan tsend (the shrine eliminated him), 
speaks of the reverence and power that the Kashmir 
people associate with the shrine, and the fury and pain 
they felt at the theft of the relic (Gauhar 1998: 104).
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While some of these changes were on, what happened 
to the Action Committee and its unity? Did it sustain? 
Though its members stayed together for a while, and 
sought to perpetuate the group as a political force in the 
state, disagreements on basic issues, and other personal 
rivalries returned to prove to be a handicap to the group’s 
effective functioning (Lockwood 1969: 387). Finally on 
20 June 1964, Mirwaiz Farooq, the pro-Pakistan religious 
cleric, announced his decision to set up a separate political 
party in the state: the Awami Action Committee. This led 
to his removal from the previous Relic Action Committee, 
following which the traditional sher-bakra rivalry30 between 
the supporters of Abdullah and Mirwaiz became alive again. 
Thus a unity forged by the theft of a sacred symbol thinned 
out after a while, as the sentiment over the symbol diluted 
following its recovery. 
Conclusion 
The protests following the relic episode while they initially 
appeared to be limited in seeking its recovery following its 
theft from the Hazratbal shrine, very soon came to influ-
ence many other aspects and processes that have shaped or 
have been associated with the Kashmir issue. Not only did 
the incident have implications inside the Valley, leading to 
a heightened regional consciousness and a strong anti-
India sentiment among the Kashmiri Muslims, it also left 
its imprint outside Kashmir, influencing India Pakistan 
relationship, besides inciting communal riots across the 
subcontinent, in a number of places. But more importantly, 
the episode reveals how the displacement of a sacred 
relic: the moi-e-muqaddas from its sanctuary, the Hazratbal 
shrine, highly revered by Kashmiri Muslims, and a symbol 
of their sacral consciousness, provides an occasion that not 
only unites an otherwise internally divided Muslim commu-
nity of the region, both socially and politically, particularly 
through the establishment of the Action Committee, 
also becomes an instrument to articulate their regional 
consciousness in the process, as they demand the resolu-
tion of the Kashmir issue according to their own wishes: yeh 
mulk hamara hai, iska faisla hum karenge. In general the relic 
theft and its aftermath exemplifies how the sacred and the 
political are deeply intertwined in Kashmir politics, and in 
South Asia at large. 
 
Endnotes 
1. Sacred is not an easy concept to define. Muslims 
themselves compete over or debate different modes of 
sacredness. See Desplat and Schulz 2012: 23. Sacred can 
be a broad and a complicated category. In a more general 
sense, the term serves to describe objects, people, places, 
and superhuman agents charged with a power, a quality, 
or an essence set apart from its opposite, the profane. 
For example, sacred place might refer to a site associated 
with a revered person, a miraculous event, or superhuman 
power. See Cormack 2013: 4. Nevertheless, sacred objects 
and places or spaces do not necessarily reflect an accurate 
image of society but are symbols with which society 
identifies itself. See Wheeler 2006: 4.
2. Bhat offers a vernacular perspective, excerpted from 
various books mostly penned by local Kashmiris, on how 
the relic made it to Kashmir and the miracles associated 
with it. 
3. On these occasions: Milad-un-Nabi and Mairaj-i-Alam, 
the relic is displayed to the public. The public display and 
procession of hairs at mosques and madrasas, especially on 
the occasion of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, is 
mentioned in a number of sources. See Wheeler 2006: 74.
4. Apparently during these occasions, around 100,000 
people stay awake in the shrine through the whole night, 
involving themselves in prayers. This is called shabkhwani. 
5. The flow of blessing and grace. Baraka can be found 
within physical objects, places, and people, as chosen by 
God. It flows from God to those that are closest to God, 
such as prophets and saints. Among other ways, one can 
attain baraka by visiting holy shrines. 
6. The pir-muridi relationship is central to Sufism in the 
religious life of Islam.
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7. An orthodox religious group among Muslims that 
denounces shrine worshipping and other social and 
cultural practices ordinarily associated with the practice of 
Islam as heretic.
8. A governing body/trust supposed to look after the 
management and the maintenance of shrines in Kashmir. 
9. The Kashmiri Muslim community was divided in two 
camps. One camp espoused their support for National 
Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah, while the other 
camp supported Muslim Conference headed by Mirwaiz 
Yusuf Shah, an influential religious cleric. The supporters 
of the two camps were known as sher (lions) and bakra 
(goats) respectively. While the National Conference 
claimed to be secular in its political outlook, the Muslim 
Conference appeared to advance the interests of the 
Kashmiri Muslims. The rivalry between the two groups, 
which emerged in the post 1930s, was quite legendary. 
The two groups and their supporters had their influence 
and control over specific mosques and neighbourhoods in 
the Srinagar city. While the Hazratbal shrine was under 
the control of the National Conference, the Jamia Masjid 
in Srinagar was a strong hold of the Muslim Conference, 
backed by the Mirwaiz family, who were very prominent.
10. Until 1965, the Jammu Kashmir state was headed 
by a wazir-azam (Prime Minister). However, the Indian 
government forced a change in the nomenclature to Chief 
Minister, in tune with other Indian states.
11. To remerge from the sacred state (Ihram) which 
a Muslim must enter in order to perform the major 
pilgrimage (Hajj) or the minor pilgrimage (Umrah). A 
pilgrim must enter into this state before crossing the 
pilgrimage boundary, known as Miqat, by performing the 
cleansing rituals and wearing the prescribed attire. Once 
he returns from this state, the pilgrim has to perform the 
desacralisation ritual (Ihlal), which includes shaving one’s 
hair, cutting nails and removing the prescribed attire, the 
Ihram clothing. 
12. December is very cold in Kashmir. At the time of 
the theft it had already snowed in the Valley. This is 
corroborated by Inder Malhotra, a well-known journalist 
from Delhi who was among the press-corps who visited 
Srinagar to report on the crisis.
13. Moslems Riot Over Theft of Sacred Relic. Chicago 
Tribune, December 29, 1963.
14. One popular version of events is that the 
disappearance was engineered by Bakshi himself. In 
October 1963 Congress had forced him to resign from 
the Prime Minister’s office under the Kamraj Plan to be 
replaced by a relative lightweight, Khwaja Shamsuddin. 
Thirty-eight charges of corruption were eventually 
brought against Bakshi by a judicial investigator, of which 
15 were proven. Bakshi thus hoped to use the chaos to 
establish his indispensability to the Indian state. See 
Swami 2007: 42.
15. The Pandits and Sikhs constitute the minority 
community in Kashmir. The Pandits represent the Hindu 
Brahmin community in Kashmir, and are supposed to be 
very learned. While the Pandits claim to be the original 
inhabitants of the Valley, they have not been supportive 
of the political movement in Kashmir that seeks secession 
from India. See Dhar, 2006.
16. The Holy Relic Action Committee was to be 
spearheaded by Mirwaiz Farooq and Maulana Masoodi. 
17. Sheikh Abdullah had been arrested in 1958 along with 
twenty-two of his companions in the famous Kashmir 
Conspiracy Case filed by the government of Kashmir and 
the government of India. The trail of the case began in 
1959, but it was later withdrawn in 1964. He had previously 
been arrested in August 1953 by the Indian government 
while serving as the Prime Minister of Kashmir, but later 
released in 1958. 
18. While replying to President Ayub Khan’s letter, Dr. 
Radhakrishnan, the President of India communicated 
to him India’s disappointment on his statement on “the 
unfortunate theft of the Holy Relic from the Hazratbal 
Mosque in Kashmir, which was a matter of sorrow for the 
entire people of India, and was severely condemned by 
our Prime Minister and myself. Your Foreign Minister’s 
statement in this context was particularly unfortunate. 
Without a shred of evidence the theft of the relic was 
attributed to Hindus and a communal turn to the Hazratbal 
incident was thus given in Pakistan from the beginning. 
The Pakistani Press started the most virulent tirade 
against India and did everything to rouse, communal 
passions to an uncontrollable pitch. While the emotions 
of the people in Pakistan over the theft of the sacred relic 
were understandable, I am constrained to observe that 
irresponsible and unrestrained statements and accusations 
against India and the false cry of Islam in danger had the 
inevitable effect of inciting the Muslim population of 
East Pakistan to take revenge on the Hindus still living in 
Pakistan.” See Foreign Affairs Record. 1964. X (1).
19. Bhat 1980: 109-110.
20. Department of Information, Government of J&K. 
Srinagar: Government Press Archives, 6 Jan 1964.
21. ibid.
22. Department of Information, Government of J&K. 
Srinagar: Government Press Archives, 11 Jan 1964.
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23. ibid.
24. ibid. 
25. Department of Information, Government of J&K. 
Srinagar: Government Press Archives, 14 Jan 1964.
26. ibid. 
27. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives. 18-25 July 1964, 20185.
28. Mullik claims that until the very day of the 
authentication, the administration did not know about the 
list of the identifiers. 
29. Mullik seems to suggest that Sheikh Abdullah’s release 
was decided by Sadiq himself. And while Nehru supported 
Sadiq’s desire to do so, he felt unhappy that the decision 
had been taken by him unilaterally, and an announcement 
had been made without consulting the government of India.
30. See endnote number 9. 
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